Normal view MARC view ISBD view

Efficiency and Legitimacy [electronic resource] : Trade-Offs in IMF Governance / Carlo Cottarelli.

By: Cottarelli, Carlo.
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookSeries: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper: No. 05/107Publisher: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2005Description: 1 online resource (32 p.).ISBN: 1451861265 :.ISSN: 1018-5941.Subject(s): International Institutions | International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions | International Monetary Cooperation | Monetary Cooperation | Monetary Fund | Paper | ArgentinaAdditional physical formats: Print Version:: Efficiency and Legitimacy : Trade-Offs in IMF GovernanceOnline resources: IMF e-Library | IMF Book Store Abstract: Designing appropriate governance structures for an international financial institution such as the IMF is difficult, because steps to enhance the legitimacy of such an institution through constraints on its decision-making process may affect its operational efficiency. Potential trade-offs between legitimacy and efficiency exist for any public institution but are arguably more severe for an international one, because delegating power to it politically controversial and, thus, likely to imply tighter constraints. The paper also underscores that the trade-offs are not absolute, however: they depend on the specific ways in which legitimacy is pursued-that is, on the specific constraints that are set. Strategic reforms should, thus, aim at improving the terms of the trade-off by exploring steps that are Pareto-improving in the dimensions of legitimacy and efficiency.
Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
    average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)
No physical items for this record

Designing appropriate governance structures for an international financial institution such as the IMF is difficult, because steps to enhance the legitimacy of such an institution through constraints on its decision-making process may affect its operational efficiency. Potential trade-offs between legitimacy and efficiency exist for any public institution but are arguably more severe for an international one, because delegating power to it politically controversial and, thus, likely to imply tighter constraints. The paper also underscores that the trade-offs are not absolute, however: they depend on the specific ways in which legitimacy is pursued-that is, on the specific constraints that are set. Strategic reforms should, thus, aim at improving the terms of the trade-off by exploring steps that are Pareto-improving in the dimensions of legitimacy and efficiency.

Description based on print version record.

There are no comments for this item.

Log in to your account to post a comment.

Ⓒ 2020 Dedan Kimathi University of Technology

Library