partisanship, punishment, and protest Abouharb, M. Rodwan creator author. Reinsberg, Bernhard author. text enk 2023 monographic eng 1 online resource (115 pages) : digital, PDF file(s). This Element argues that governments allocate adjustment burdens strategically to protect their supporters, imposing adjustment costs upon the supporters of their opponents, who then protest in response. Using large-N micro-level survey data from three world regions and a global survey, it discusses the local political economy of International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending. It finds that opposition supporters in countries under IMF structural adjustment programs (SAP) are more likely to report that the IMF SAP increased economic hardships than government supporters and countries without IMF exposure. In addition, it finds that partisan gaps in IMF SAP evaluations widen in IMF program countries with an above-median number of conditions, suggesting that opposition supporters face heavier adjustment burdens, and that opposition supporters who think SAPs made their lives worse are more likely to protest. M. Rodwan Abouharb, Bernhard Reinsberg. Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 16 Nov 2023). International Monetary Fund. International finance Debts, Public HG3881.5.I58 A36 2023 332.152 Elements in international relations 9781009451116 (ebook) https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009451116 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009451116 UkCbUP 230620 20250826121305.0 CR9781009451116 eng